How Has the Way Parties Choose Presidential Candidates Changed since the 1960s?
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In the 1960s, presidential primaries were slowly becoming more relevant to the nomination process. For example, one of the reasons that President Johnson decided not to run for another term was because of his poor primary performance against his challenger, Eugene McCarthy. The subsequent nomination of Vice President Hubert Humphrey, who supported the Vietnam War, over McCarthy, who campaigned against the conflict, and the beating of anti-war protestors outside of the convention were the catalysts that led to a push towards the modern nomination process. The McGovern-Fraser reforms within the Democratic Party gave rank-and-file party members a direct role in choosing the candidates by allocating delegates to primaries and caucuses, which the Republicans soon emulated.
However, following these reforms, the interest groups and elites who had previously dictated the nomination process then adapted to the new system to ensure that their voices were heard during the process. This means that the democratization of the primary process did not eliminate the role of the party, but simply altered it to a new context. One example of this occurring is through the establishment of superdelegates in the Democratic Party in 1982, who are delegates that can vote however they wish and are not elected.
However, following these reforms, the interest groups and elites who had previously dictated the nomination process then adapted to the new system to ensure that their voices were heard during the process. This means that the democratization of the primary process did not eliminate the role of the party, but simply altered it to a new context. One example of this occurring is through the establishment of superdelegates in the Democratic Party in 1982, who are delegates that can vote however they wish and are not elected.
Data analyzing how state governors endorsed presidential candidates following the establishment of the primary systems show that it became increasingly common for a consensus to form around a single candidate, who would receive a plurality of governor endorsements. Factionalism still exists within the party, of course, but party elites usually come together to endorse a single candidate that they believe will perform the best in the general election, not much unlike the way that party elites chose candidates before the McGovern-Fraser reforms. For example, Jesse Jackson was not seen as someone who could speak to all of America, whereas Bill Clinton held broader appeal and eventually ended up with majority support.
The 2016 primary season for the Republicans, however, seems to suggest that the theory of “the party decides” may not be watertight. Donald Trump, a political outsider, not only successfully cleared a field of well-known and well-funded Republican candidates, but then went on to beat Hillary Clinton, who had been a key figure within the Democratic Party since her husband’s presidency.
Part of the reason that Trump was able to win the Republican primary was because of the inability of the party to coalesce around a single candidate in a field of 17 candidates. Differing wings within the party, from Cruz’s far-right constitutional fundamentalists to Bush’s neoconservative and more moderate establishment voters clashed and fought among themselves, allowing Trump to capture the media spotlight and drum up public support.
However, it should be noted that the theory of “the party decides” does not state that party elites exercise de facto control over who the nominee is. Instead, it simply argues that elites still have an outsized amount of influence over the nomination process, which is true. However, that outsized influence can still be overcome by the voters if they turn up in significant enough numbers — which is exactly what happened with Trump, who was able to win “more total votes than any Republican primary candidate in the history of Republican presidential primaries.”
This was helped by Trump’s anti-establishment character. His brash character meant that the media was concerned with what he was saying and doing almost constantly, and a phalanx of new media outlets like Breitbart emerged online to spread positive coverage about his candidacy. This helped Trump overcome the fundraising gap that he suffered as an outsider when compared to candidates like Bush or Cruz
Further, general dissatisfaction with the party establishment, and deep divisions on specific policy areas, gave Trump an opening which he was able to easily take advantage of. As Trump gained momentum, it simply did not matter that he had not secured many endorsements of party elites and officials: the role of those endorsements was to gain media coverage, funds and popular support to win primaries and thus the nomination. Already enjoying burgeoning popular support and near-constant media coverage, a lack of hard cash was not enough to stop a Trump victory during the primary season.
Therefore, it is possible that Trump’s victory is simply an outlier, in which he was able to take advantage of a transitional period within a party and rising populism in America to buck party tradition and win the nomination as an outsider by virtue of being an outsider. In the future, this strategy may no longer work, and the nomination process may shift back towards “the party decides,” but it is undeniable that the 2016 election cycle proved to be disruptive for the nomination process in such a way that is still not fully understood.
